According to Optimus, there are significant discrepancies in the method used to calculate fault repair times, resulting in significant disagreements as to performance and the respective calculation of the compensation that PTC is required to pay Optimus for failing to meet the established target.
Optimus claims that such disparities result mainly from three aspects:
(a) Differences in criteria for determining the instants of opening and closing faults.
According to Optimus, PTC registers a fault as being closed by reference to the date and time that the fault was actually repaired, regardless of when notice of the repair is given to Optimus. However, Optimus claims that the process of determining resolution of the fault with the customer can only occur upon PTC's notification, given that the end-customer will remain unaware that the fault has been repaired, unless the repair is actually carried out on the end-customer's premises or unless the end-customer is continually testing the service.
Optimus stresses that, in point 7.2.4 of annex 12 of the RUO, it is determined that the closure of a fault occurs "when the owner of the fault informs the owner of the problem that the fault has been resolved".
Optimus calls for clarification to be provided on this matter, to ensure that there is an alignment between PTC's objectives and those of the OSP and the end-customer.
Optimus also claims that, in the case of faults where there is a requirement to schedule intervention, there is no maximum limit on the period of time which elapses between the date on which scheduling is communicated and the scheduled date (and time), whereas PTC only counts the period of time elapsing from the date scheduled for the fault's repair 1.
Such situations were also identified by PwC, which reported that the beginning and end of the service's interruption were not being counted in an appropriate manner and that, in certain cases, measurement of the period was halted without the fault actually being repaired or the supplied service operating properly.
(b) Differences in criteria for measuring fault repair times in situations of multiple fault occurrence.
Optimus argues that PTC has strong incentive to close faults improperly, claiming that situations of reoccurrence (or improperly closed faults) are being considered as new faults.
Furthermore, Optimus reports that it had informally agreed a process with PTC for reopening faults whereby, following an incorrect closure of a fault, it is reopened where so requested within 8 working hours following its closure. According to Optimus, this systems means that situations of improper closure are flagged and that these faults are reported as being open for a longer period, with application of the system of joint interventions 2 providing quicker resolution. However, Optimus reports that PTC does not accept measurement of these faults, in terms of service level agreements (SLA), as a single fault (whereas Optimus accepts that the period of time elapsing between the initial closure by PTC and its reopening by Optimus may be excluded from consideration), choosing to consider two separate faults.
In addition to the disagreement over PTC's stance, as described above, Optimus considers that the time limits agreed informally as on the reopening faults are short and preclude timely analysis (4 consecutive hours under the Rede ADSL PT and WLRO and 8 consecutive hours under the RUO).
According to Optimus, about 30 percent of faults are subject to reopening and, in about 70 percent of the cases, it is concluded that, as the fault persisted, PTC's closure of the fault was improper.
(c) Disagreement between the parties on the allocation of responsibility for the fault.
Optimus calls attention to the absence, in wholesale offers, of any mechanism to assign responsibilities for the purposes of invoicing, claiming, in its case, that disagreements in this regard have amounted to around 16,000 euros (to March 2011).
Optimus reported that, at the end of 2007, it agreed on a procedure with PTC on the assignment of responsibility in faults under dispute for the purposes of invoicing (but not applicable, however, for SLA purposes). This agreement was based on applying a ratio of responsibility determined through an analysis of samples (over a certain period of time during which Optimus technicians accompanied PTC technicians in the repair of faults). However, the agreement was terminated by PTC at the end of 2009.
This issue was also raised by a communication submitted by OniTelecom which states that the absence of proper documentation supporting the communication of undue faults has caused ongoing disputes between PTC and OniTelecom, whenever there was any question as to the correct classification of these faults.
In this case too, PwC noted that there were cases of fault repairs that were not included in the indicators reported by PTC, particularly when the company considered that offer beneficiaries were responsible for the fault.
In the particular case of the RUO, Optimus:
(a) proposes that certain procedures/services be formally regulated and/or made subject to regulatory intervention, including joint interventions, common fault detection mechanisms and assisted restoration of service 3.
(b) identifies, as critical, the effect of seasonality in certain exchange areas resulting in significant increases in the volume of customer complaints, with the service cut off for periods which far exceed those contracted, leading to an increase in customer churn rate. According to Optimus:
- the service provided to customers connected to exchange areas in Greater Porto and to the exchange area of Caneças have been constantly affected during the months of highest rainfall, with waiting times for the resolution of faults far exceeding those defined under the quality of service targets - in some situations, fault repair times exceed 20 days (which compares very unfavourably with the maximum repair times reported for NORMAL loops - 28 working hours).
- a sub-universe of faults recorded in periods of adverse weather result from common faults occurring in PTC cables which affect multiple customers simultaneously. Optimus claims that this type of fault has a significant impact, requiring a rapid response in its resolution and its communication to the OSP. Additionally, when such faults occur, Optimus reports that, generally, no estimate is given for the time to resolution and no detail or update is given of the status of the situation in question.
- it questioned PTC in early 2010 on the implementation of procedures to minimize the effects of the winter months on the volume of faults; without going into detail, PTC responded that it had taken a number of measures, whereas Optimus considers that the level of faults reported in early 2010 in no way indicates that the situation is under control; as such Optimus questions the implementation of any consequent action.
(c) reports that, in the calculation of compensation payable for non-fulfilment of quality of service levels, PTC calculates the indicators every six months; this is inconsistent with the provisions of the offer - even while the assessment of quality of service should be performed every six months for the purposes of payment of the respective compensation (as stipulated in section 2.7 of Annex 13 of the RUO), the indicators should be calculated on a quarterly basis (as stipulated in Annex 12 of the RUO). Optimus claims that, with PTC's approach, the poor results observed during the fourth quarter of the year (with periods of heavy rainfall) are "offset" by the higher levels of service that are generally observed in the third quarter; the same occurs with respect to the first (also heavy rainfall) and second quarters.
1 Optimus states that in the WLRO, these situations represent over 90% of cases, and in many situations, PTC undertakes repair of the fault prior to the scheduled date.
2 According to Optimus, joint interventions are used, above all, in cases of fault reoccurrence.
3 PwC also noted that there were procedures such as joint intervention, which, while resulting from an agreement between PTC and the beneficiaries were not formally defined, meaning that compliance with these procedures could not be ensured, so hindering the continuity and traceability of the process in situations which may impact the allocation of responsibility for faults and undermining the performance of processes and levels of service provided by the beneficiaries to the end-customer.
